Hardt’s text “Affective Labor,” is simultaneously provocative and dissapointing. After detailing the emergence of the third system, that of affective and immaterial labor, Hardt suggests that the affective can actually be used to debilitate capitalism. Here, Hardt is remniscent of Massumi, in that they both argue that we can use affect to free ourselves. Though, it seems that Massumi is much more vague in reference to that which we are free from. Sometimes it seems that Massumi thinks affect is the cure all solution to everyday problems facing humanity. In any event, he is quite vague. Returning to the text, Hardt provides that although affective labor is the means by which capitalism operates, it can also be used in a subversive capacity. In fact, he argues that the intimacy of affect to the immaterial system, insists that it must be used. Although this suggestion is momentarily provocative, Hardt fails to provide a suitable follow through to his ambitious proclamation. Although it seems that this argument is acceptable, Hardt fails to provide a concise synopsis or, even, a simplistic suggestion, of the means by which one can use the affective-bottom to subvert the affective-top.
Despite Hardt’s greater failure, several portions of the text are quite beneficial to those hoping to develop a better, more concise, understanding of the new economy. First, it seems entirely evident, as Hardt suggests, that new and interesting divisions in labor are occurring. Hardt argues, quite effectively, that there are three types of immaterial labor. On one level, as he denotes, industrial production has become more informational. Also, there is the category of the analytic or symbolic task. This category can be subdivided into the routine manipulation of symbols, and creative or intelligent interaction. Finally, there is also exists a subsection of the system responsible for the production and manipulation of affect. In consideration of the immaterial or informational system, this seems to be the contention that many fail to perceive. One forgets the divisions inherent to a system, and assumes that the arrival of the informational occurred in conjunction with the disolution of divisions.
Second, another important success in Hardt’s work, is the means by which he demonstrates that the agricultural, industrial, and immaterial systems exist simultaneously. Hardt suggests that it is not a simple matter of progression from one point to another; an evolution from the agricultural to the immaterial. It is not that the immaterial replaces the agricultural, but, rather, that both exist simultaneously. If anything, the agricultural becomes inextricably bound to the immaterial, instead of being subsumed or replaced.
Despite these successes, the conclusion, or lack there of, is actually quite debilitating. Although Hardt’s revision of Foucault’s concept of biopower is provocative, it is ill pursued. It seems quite acceptable that biopower actually comes from both below and above. The problem, again, is not related to the argument. Rather, it is, as stated previously, that Hardt provides little more than a suggestion as to the means by which one can use this affective power to subvert the system. Perhaps, this text would not have been so entirely dissapointing if Hardt had not have suggested the subversive capacity of affect in the first place.
